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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INGA-LILL ELTON, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT 
BOARD, an agency of the 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
12809 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal to the district court from an 
administrative ruling of the Utah State Retirement Board 
denying a widow's pension to the widow of the late Judge 
Leonard W. Elton. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, Judge Ferdinand Erickson 
presiding without a jury, heard the case de novo and 
ruled in favor of the widow's claim and against the Utah 
State Retirement Board. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the dis. 
trict court and an order affirming the decision of the Re. 
tirement Board. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Judge Elton died the morning of May 13, 1970, from 
a stroke (55: 19). At the onset of the fatal stroke he was 
at home in his bedroom preparing to dress himself (92:21). 
His most recent prior physical activity had been 2.ssisting 
his wife with the measurement of r. staircase (92:20). He! 
had spent more than normal time at home that morning, i 
since the prior day he had announced his decision in an \ 
important case, the Sunday closing case, and he felt he 
was entitled to an extra hour (92: 16). He would have 
commenced a jury case that morning at 11 o'clock a.m. 
at the courthouse but for the stroke (92: 13). 
Judge Elton had a history of cardiovascular disease. I 
On February 4, 1954, while a practicing attorney, he 
underwent a physical examination including an ekg 
(42:29). The examination disclosed heart disease (42:25), 
and specifically a recent heart attack (43:3) of a moder· 
ately serious nature (59:7). Judge Elton was skeptical that 
he had had a heart attack (59:8) and in fact told the doc· 
tor he was nuts (43:8). Some twelve years later, in 1966, 
Leonard Elton was appointed district judge in the Third 
Judicial District. 
2 
The events leading up to the stroke were the follow-
ing: Sometime in the summer of 1968, Judge Elton had 
episodes of dizziness (51:26). On January 9, 1969, he 
suffered a severe stroke as a result of which he was hos-
pitalized for a period of nine days, from January 9 through 
January 17, 1969 (44: 15; 45: 13, 26; 62:3-14; 63-1-10). 
Following release from the hospital he was totally dis-
abled for a period of one or two months ( 31: 3). He then 
began to return to work beginning with an hour a day 
and increasing his work to two hours, and gradually work-
ing up to a full day's work by October 3, 1969 (84: 16; 
47:24). At first, his attending physician, Dr. Robert M. 
Dalrymple, made home visits (65:24-30), but later he set 
up a visit schedule for Judge Elton, one visit a month 
(48:22) and put the patient on a vaso-dilator type machine, 
the purpose of which was to dilate the blood vessels so 
that they would carry more blood, even though they 
might be partially blocked (66:8-16). 
Judge Elton became presiding judge of the Third Dis-
trict in January 1970 (31:26). Although one of his duties 
in that capacity was the assigning of cases to other judges, 
he was a conscientious judge, as are all of the judges in 
that district (18:26), and he retained for decision by him-
self some difficult cases in which there was considerable 
public interest, although there were other sensitive cases 
handled by other judges on the court at the same time 
(37:6-10). 
Judge Elton had a propensity for cardiovascular and 
cerebral vascular disease, and it was likely that one stroke 
might be followed by another (66: 1). He began to fail 
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somewhat in March 1970 (49:15-28; 51:9-14), and 00 
April 21st he had another disabling stroke which required 
him to cease working (54:3). By May 2, 1970, he still was 
not well (54:26), but by May 9th he seemed to have im-
proved somewhat (55:8). On May 12th he rendered his 
decision on the Sunday closing case, which was one of the 
sensitive cases he had been in the process of deciding, and 
he suffered the fatal stroke on May 13th. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
JUDGE ELTON DIED AS THE RESULT OF 
A DISEASE AND NOT AS THE RESULT OF 
AN ACCIDENT. 
The pertinent statute is part of the now repealed 
Judges Retirement Act, Sec. 49-7-4 Utah Code Annotated 
1953. It states: " ... and the widow of every judge 
who is killed by accident arising out of or in the course 
of his employment, wheresoever such injury occurred, 
shall be entitled to the . . . widows' pensions . . . pro· 
vided for in this Act." The vital part of the statute, the 
quoted language, was apparently taken verbatim from the 
Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, Sec. 35-1-45, U.C.A. 
1953. That act provides compensation for the death of 
every employee who is killed ". . . by accident arising 
out of or in the course of his employment, wheresoever 
such injury occurred, ... " In view of the identity of 
language, it seems probable that workmen's compensa· 
tion decisions will provide the best criteria in interpreting 
the meaning of the Judges Retirement Act. Before moving 
to a discussion of the cases, however, it is instructive to 
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consider the testimony of Dr. Dalrymple who testified in 
behalf of the plaintiff, and also the testimony of the plain-
tiff herself. From that it will be clearly seen that the 
plaintiff did not meet her burden of proof. 
Judge Elton had his heart attack at the time he was a 
practicing lawyer, in 1954 or shortly before. The heart 
attack probably was caused from an occlusion of a blood 
vessel, and that is the same kind of condition that appar-
ently caused Judge Elton's stroke (59:22). The blood ves-
sels become thickened and filled with a yellow-gray cal-
cified material, a kind of sludge which attaches itself to 
the inner lining of the vessel (59:26). The heart attack 
occurred some twelve years before Judge Elton was ap-
pointed to the District Court bench and some sixteen 
years before he became presiding judge and before he 
undertook the decision of the two "sensitive" cases which 
are much alluded to in the plaintiff's testimony. The 
causative condition, the plugging of the vessel, is a vas-
cular disease (52:6-20). It is this underlying condition, the 
vascular disease, that causes the death of the stroke patient 
(58:17-21). And in the case of stroke patients, death may 
come while a person is driving a car or home in bed or 
reading the newspaper or doing anything else (58:23-27). 
There was no question in Dr. Dalrymple's mind but that 
the stroke in January of 1969 was caused by a cerebral 
thrombosis, and there was no question in his mind but that 
death in the following year was caused likewise from a 
cerebral thrombosis ( 7 0: 14-17). In order to confirm his 
findings, Dr. Dalrymple had Judge Elton examined by a 
neurologist at the time of the first stroke and while he 
was a patient at St. Mark's Hospital (61: 17-29); 62:25 
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to 63: 10). There is entirely absent from the record anv 
testimony about weighty or sensitive cases under consid. 
eration by Judge Elton at the time of the January 1969 
stroke. 
Dr. Dalrymple testified that although cardiovascular 
disease is a part of the normal aging process, it was rather 
advanced in Judge Elton's case (64:6). He testified that I 
it is sometimes aggravated by diet and physical condition ' 
(64:8). He further testified that the underlying condition, 
the occlusion of the blood vessels, did not occur suddenly 
but had built up over a period of time (68: 16-23). He 
also testified that the autopsy showed evidence of prev· 
ious damage to the brain, a softening and changes in the 
tissues which he described as necrosis or destruction of 
the tissue. He stated that the brain tissue at the base of the 
brain showed degenerative changes, and some of these 
showed cysts containing fluid which evidenced to him 
damage of long standing ( 7 0: 3 0 to 71 : 16). He testified that 
there is nothing in the profession of district judges that 
increases the likelihood that one will have a stroke and 
that although people who work under a lot of pressure ' 
have a high incidence of vascular diseases, this is not lim· 
ited to the sedentary type occupations, but could occur 
just as readily in a man who works with his hands (74:1· 
18). In conclusion of his cross-examination, Dr. Dalrym· 
pie testified that what happened in Judge Elton's case 
happens quite frequently with stroke patients, that if they 
have a prospensity for the disease they may have one 
stroke followed on by another, which may or may not be 
fatal, and that what happened in Judge Elton's case is 
typical of the syndrome rather than unusual (75:17·29). 
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a 
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When plaintiff's counsel asked Dr. Dalrymple about 
causal connection between the stress of Judge Elton's work 
as a judge and his death, he would not say that there was 
a causative relation. The record, on direct examina-
tion, runs like this: 
Q. Well, the question is, do you have a medi-
cal opinion as to whether or not the stress as you 
have described was apparent during the two 
months prior to Leonard Elton's death had any 
effect upon the underlying vascular disease? 
A. This certainly is a matter of professional 
opinion. I wouldn't want to pretend to give any 
definite authoritative opinion on this. 
Q. Well, give us your medical opinion as a 
doctor, if you have one. 
A. Well, I think it is well established that 
people who have an underlying disease could have 
it aggravated by stress. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or 
not there was aggravation in this case involving 
Judge Elton? 
A. In view of the historical set up and the 
symptoms of stressful situations, I would say it 
did. 
Q. Do you have a medical opinion as to 
whether his aggravation was or was not related to 
his death on May 13, 1970? 
A. I can't answer that directly, sir. All I 
could say in my opinion I think it would have been 
a contributing factor. 
Q. Can you state whether or not this contribu-
tcrv factor had any effect so far as causing his 
death at that particular time? In other words, 
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bringing on the onset of his death or triggering I 
his death. 
A. If it was a contributing factor, it would 
be contributing to the underlying condition, hut I 
do not think it caused the underlying condition. 
Q. I understand that, but acting on the under. 
lying condition, do you have an opinion as to 
whether or not this aggravation hastened his 
death? 
A. In my own humble opinion from purely 
historical finding, something aggravated it and 
that seemed to he the principal factor at that time. 
(Emphasis added). 
That testimony is consistent with what Dr. Dalrymple 
said later in cross-examination, referred to previously, 
that anyone can have a stroke in just about any place at 
any time doing anything. 
POINT II 
THE PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT 
REQUIRE SOME WORK - RELATED INCI-
DENT OR ACCIDENT. 
Under the recent decisions of this court, some identifi· 
able work-related incident, or accident, is required in order 
to bring a death or injury within the provisions of the 
Workmen's Compensation statute. This construction of 
the Act seems eminently logical and reasonable. The pur· 
pose of the legislation was to place on industry the bur· 
den of caring for those men, or their dependents, who 
are injured or killed on the job from the hazards of the 
job. The unexpected, unforeseen accident is and always 
has been the focal point of the legislation. 
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In Redman iv arehousing Corp. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 22 U.2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969) this court 
considered a claim from a truck driver who had driven a 
load of furniture to San Francisco and returned. He had 
a prior history of back trouble. He noticed some pain in 
his back together with radiating pain to his leg at a truck 
stop along the way. In San Francisco he helped unload 
the van along with others. The pain persisted on the 
return trip to Salt Lake. He was later hospitalized and 
had surgery for a herniated disc. The Industrial Com-
mission adopted the finding of a medical panel that sit-
ting and driving the truck precipiated the difficulties 
which led to the applicant's operation. On the basis of the 
record this court rejected the Commission's finding, say-
ing: 
There is nothing in this record that shows 
any unusual event, or "accident," if you please, 
justifying compensability within the nature, in-
tent or spirit of the workmen's compensation act. 
To conclude otherwise would insure every truck 
driver, every railroad engineer, every airplane 
pilot, and a lot of others, against a physiological 
malfunction or physical collapse of any of hundreds 
of human organs, completely unproven as to cause, 
but compensable only by virtue of the happen-
stance that the malfunction, collapse or injury oc-
curred while the employee was on the job, and 
not home or elsewhere. 
For aught we know from this record there 
may have been any number of reasons why the 
rupture occurred when and where it did, based on 
circumstances quite foreign to the claimant's em-
ployment. In other words there is a complete ab-
sence of competent proof here to support any find-
ing with respect to the cause of the rupture, save 
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by guesswork. In other words the claimant ha5 
not met the onus of proving the "accident" in the 
course of his employment that "caused" the "in. 
jury" of which he complains, which burden is his. 
As a matter of fact the record reflects that up to 
the titlle of the pain's inception, applicant was do. 
ing exactly what he had been doing continuously 
for 11 years prior thereto, and his own testimony 
clearly negated any theory of causation by merely ' 
"sitting and driving," or of a pre-existing condi-
tion that was lighted up by the "mere sitting and 
driving" on a highway with which the applicant ! 
was familiar and which was pretty good. 
In concluding that the circumstances in this 
case did not constitute an "accident" that caused an 
"injury" in the workmen's compensation sense, we 
point to several of our own cases and other auth· 
orities. 
The case first cited at that point by this court is 
Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 14 U.2d 276, 382 P.2d 
414 (1963). Here, the claimant alleged that he had suf· 
fered injuries to his back while working in a coal mine. 
On disputed evidence the Commission denied an award 
and the denial was affirmed. This court said: 
It is, therefore, a prerequisite to compensa· 
tion that his disability be shown to result, not as 
a gradual development becauss of the nature or 
condition of his work, but from an identifiable 
accident or accidents in the course of the employ· 
ment. There being substantial evidence to support 
the Commission's finding to the contrary, no basis 
exists upon which this court could rule that i~s 
denial of compensation was capricious and arbt· 
trary. Accordingly, its order is affirmed. 
10 
Another case quoted in the Redman decision is Car-
ling v. Industrial Commission, 16 U.2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 
(1965). The claimant in that case suffered a loss of hear-
ing, and upon application to the Commission he was 
denied any relief. He then sought review of the order. This 
court noted in its report of the case that claimant had a 
long prior history of deficient hearing running back as 
early as fourteen years before the incident which he claim-
ed caused his loss of hearing. From the evidence, it ap-
peared that other doctors who had examined him and 
his records stated that they were of the opinion that there 
had been a gradual and continuous regression of his hear-
ing, and that this was not the usual pattern of a hearing 
loss suffered in the way he claimed his loss had occurred. 
Before going to the merits of the case, this court discussed 
the underlying purpose of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. It said: 
The Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 
35-1-45, U.C.A. 1953, provides for an award to 
an employee "* * * who is injured * * * by 
accident arising out of or in the course of his em-
ployment * * *." There is no further definition 
of the term "accident," but this court has held 
that for the purpose of the Act it should be given 
a broad meaning. It connotes an unanticipated, un-
intended occurrence different from what would 
normally be expected to occur in the usual course 
of events. We recognize the correctness of plain-
tiff's contention that even though there must be 
some such "accident" within the meaning of the 
statute, this is not necessarily restricted to some 
single incident which happened suddenly at one 
particular time and does not preclude the possi-
bility that due to exertion, stress or other repetitive 
cause, a climax might be reached in such manner 
11 
said: 
as to properly fall within the definition of an acci-
dent as just stated above. However, such an occur-
rence must be distinguished from gradually de-
veloping conditions which are classified as occupa-
tional diseases and which are not compensable ex-
cept as provided in Chapter 2 of Title 35 (Sec-
tions 35-2-1, et seq.), U.C.A. 1953. 
In affirming the denial of the claim, court further 
Inasmuch as there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence to support the Commission's conclusion 
that the plaintiff's loss of hearing did not result 
from a single incident, nor from an "accident" aris-
ing out of or in the course of his employment, its 
order cannot be said to be capicious or arbitrary. 
The opinion in Redman also refers to Mellen v. In· 
dustrial Commission, 19 U.2d 373, 431 P.2d 798 (1967), 
in which the claimant, a roofer, suffered severe chest pains 
while on the job and had to be hospitalized. On disputed 
evidence the Industrial Commission denied his claim and 
the denial was affirmed. The testimony in favor of the 
plaintiff rom his personal physician was that his exertion 
could have been a factor in hastening what was inevitable 
anyway, but he admitted that what occurred to the claim-
ant could have occurred at any time, any place, even while 
he was asleep. 
The claimant in Redman relied on three cases, Baker 
v. Industrial Commission, 17 U.2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 
(1965), ]ones v . California Packing Corp., 121 U. 612, 
244 P.2d 640 (1952), and Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 115 U. 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). This court 
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pointed out that the ]ones decision was a 3-2 decision 
with a strong dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Wolfe, 
who was an authority on Workmen's Compensation. It 
also pointed out that the Purity Biscuit case was a 3-2 de-
cision and that Justice Wolfe's concurring opinion there 
sounded more like a dissent. In fact, it quoted from that 
concurring opinion as follows: 
In this type of case we are dealing with situ-
ations involving death or disability which situa-
tions may, due to a functional failure, occur by 
reason of the work or may be purely coincidental 
with it. Where the death of disability occurs under 
such circumstances as to present prima facie doubt 
as whether it was caused by exertion incidental to 
the work, or an event which occurred only in the 
duration of the work and in regard to which the 
work furnished no material or efficient concurring 
or cooperating cause, then, before a favorable 
award is made, it should appear by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the exertion in pursuance of 
the work was at least an efficient cooperating 
cause of the disability or death. The commission 
should have clear and convincing proof that the 
exertion done as a part of the work, whether ordi-
nary or extraordinary, was a factor which materi-
ally contributed to or caused the death or disabil-
ity. Unless the commission requires clear and con-
vincing proof that the disability was employment 
connected, that is, materially contributed to by 
the work performed, we may open wide the door 
to compensating nonemployment connected death 
or disabilities which the act was not intended to 
cover. This rule I suppose is primarily one of 
guidance for the commission. It would seem that 
unless no reasonable mind could say that the evi-
dence was clear and convincing, the commission 
could not be overturned for arbitrariness. 
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In the Mellen case, the court cited Burton v. Indus-
trial Commission, 13 U.2d 353, 374 P.2d 439 (1962), in 1 
which the Supreme Court sustained the denial of an award 
where decedent had suffered severe chest pains while 
doing delivery work for his employer. He was taken by 
ambulance to the hospital and died that afternoon. The 
cause of death was diagnosed as coronary thrombosis with 
myocardial infarction. The Commission had denied an 
award on the ground that death did not result from an 
accident arising out of or in the course of deceased's em-
ployment. The court pointed out: 
In response to the question as to whether the 
deceased' s exertion in lifting and delivering the 
cases of beer was a contributing cause to the oc-
currence of Mr. Burton's heart attack, the doctor 
answered that, "It could be a factor." 
In this case the applicant had the duty to prove by a 
preponderence of the evidence that the decedent died as 
the result of an accident caused by his employmnt or re· 
suiting from his employment. The evidence before the 
court not only does not preponderate in favor of the appli-
cant but actually runs the other way. The evidence is that 
Judge Elton had a cardiovascular condition which in all 
probability had caused the earlier heart attack and which 
was clearly the cause of his recent strokes. It would not 
have mattered what he had been doing or where he was 
at the time the blood vessel to his brain was plugged. 
His stroke would have occurred no matter where he was 
and no matter what he was doing, and his occupation had 
nothing to do with it, other than that there was undoubt· 
edly some physical attrition resulting from his work just 
as there is in any occupation under any circumstances to 
any person. The Workmen's Compensation Act, and the 
Retirement statute we are here concerned with which is 
patterned after the Workmen's Compensation Act, were 
not intended to recompense an employee or his dependents 
where there is no accident arising out of or in the course 
of the employment. The fact that a medical doctor may 
choose to ref er to a stroke as a cerebral vascular accident 
does not make that occurrence an accident within the 
meaning of the statutes under consideration. That medi-
cal term is something entirely different from a Workmen's 
Compensation term. There was no accident here which 
would justify an award. 
POINT III 
JUDGE EL TON'S STROKE DID NOT ARISE 
OUT OF, OR OCCUR IN THE COURSE OF 
HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
To justify an award, not only must there have been 
an accident causing death but it must have been one 
"arising out of or in the course of his employment." The 
Workmen's Compensation program, and in this case the 
Judges' Retirement Act, were not designed to provide 
compensation, even if there were an accident, unless the 
employee at the time was engaged in his employer's busi-
ness. Preparations at home to go to work have never 
been compensable, and indeed even the act of traveling to 
the employer's place of business is not compensable. In 
fact, in one recent case, Lundberg v. Cream o'W eber /Fed-
erated Dairy Farms, Inc., 24 U.2d 16, 465 P.2d 175 ( 1970), 
the court said: 
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Notwithstanding what has been said in those 
cases, it is fundamental that even though the em. 
ployee may not be at a regular place of work, he 
must be performing a duty for his employer, or 
one which is so connected with his employment as 
to be an essential part thereof, so that the mandate 
of the statute is met that there must be an "acci-
dent arising out of or in the course of employ-
ment." 
To the same effect is the decision in Askren v. Indus-
trial Commission, 15 U.2d 275, 391 P.2d 302 (1964), in 
which the employee was using a cafeteria maintained by 
an independent contractor on the employer's premises. 
Although the court found that the eating activity was an 
integral part of her employer's business and advantageous 
to the employer, it stated the general rule in this fashion: 
The essential thing is that there be some sub· 
stantial relationship between the activity engaged 
in and the carrying on of the employer's business. 
That is, it should be of such a nature that it may 
reasonably be assumed that it would be of some 
benefit or advantage to the employer in the opera· 
tion of his business or the advancement of his in· 
terests. 
A case in which compensation was awarded is State 
Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commission, 15 U.2d 363, 
393 P.2d 397 (1964). Here the court found that the cor· 
porate employee had gone to one office and although he 
had returned to his apartment for breakfast, he had left 
from there to go to another office, and it held that he was 
in the course of his employment. The court said: "It is 
not necessary to refer to the numerous cases in which this 
court has held that an employee is not covered by the 
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Workmen's Compensation Act while going to or from 
work. Certainly, if Mr. Sander had merely arisen that fatal 
morning, had his breakfast, and then left his apartment 
to drive to the west-side office, we would have no problem 
- his death would not be compensable." 
An earlier case, M & K Corporation v. Industrial 
Commission, 112 U. 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948), contains 
an informative discussion of what is required to bring an 
accident within the phraseoolgy, "arising out of or in the 
course of" the employment. At Page 134 this court said: 
The distinction being that in order for an 
accident to arise out of the employment a more 
definite and closer causal relationship is required 
than is necessary for an accident to arise in the 
course of the employment but in the latter a closer 
relationship must exist as to time and place and as 
to the nature and type of work being performed. 
In other words the requirement that the accident 
arise in the course of the employment is satisfied 
if it occurs while the employee is rendering service 
to his employer which he was hired to do or doing 
something incidental thereto, at the time when 
and the place where he was authorized to render 
such service. Current Trends in Workmen's Com-
pensation by Horovitz, on what constitutes "arising 
out of" commencing at page 507, and 666. 
However, where a disease is involved, even 
under the liberal provisions of our statute, we have 
refused to open the door to a recovery for all in-
juries, without any causal relationship between the 
employment and the accident, merely because the 
accident occurs on the premises of the employer 
during the hours of employment while the em-
ployee is rendering the service or something inci-
dental thereto for which he was hired. Dee Me-
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morial Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Commission 
104 U. 61, 138 P.2d 233; Robertson v. Industrial 
Commission, 109 U. 25, 163 P.2d 331; see also . 
Horovitz's Current Trends in Workmen's Com. ! 
pensation pages 666 to 668, where the author 
justifies the above requirement even where it is 
only necessary that the accident arise in the course 
of the employment on the ground that the statute 
only requires compensation insurance and not 
health insurance. 
On the morning of his fatal attack Judge Elton did 
nothing in furtherance of his work as a judge. He had 
enjoyed a relaxed breakfast. He and his wife had perused 
the newspaper accounts of his decision rendered the day 
before. He had been in a relaxed and jovial mood. He was 
taking an extra hour to get to court. He assisted his wife 
in measuring some stairs for a new carpet. He was dress· 
ing at the onset of the fatal stroke. 
All of these activities are purely personal. There is 
no decision known to counsel whether in the state of Utah 
or elsewhere which would award compensation under 
these circumstances. Larson, Workmen's Compensation 
Law, 1971 reprint, at Sec. 720 expresses it this way: 
At the other extreme are origins of harm so 
clearly personal that, even if they take effect while 
the employee is on the job, they could not possibly 
be attributed to the employment. If the time has 
come for the employee to die a natural death, or 
to expire from the effects of some disease or in· 
ternal weakness of which he would as promptly 
have expired whether he had been working or not, 
that fact that his demise takes place in an employ· 
ment setting rather than <J.t home does not, of 
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course, make the death compensable. Or if the 
employee has a mortal personal enemy who has 
sworn to seek him out whenever he may be, and 
if this enemy happens to find and murder the em-
ployee while th e latter is at work, the employment 
cannot be said to have had any causal relation to 
the death. The same is true if the employee, for 
reasons of his own, carries a bomb in his bosom 
(as actually happened in one case), and if the bomb 
goes off during business hours. 
This case is not even as strong as the case put by 
Larson, because the death of Judge Elton did not take 
place in an employment setting. His place of employ-
ment was the courthouse; the stroke came on while he was 
at home. His work was to hear and decide legal questions 
and to perform activities related thereto; his stroke came 
on while he was at home doing what any other man might 
have been doing who could control his own time in some 
degree and who felt that he was entitled to an extra hour 
to relax of a given morning. 
SUMMARY 
The Workmen's Compensation laws and the language 
of the Retirement Act patterned after them were not in-
tended to compensate all persons who suffer any injury 
or who die anywhere doing anything at any time. Such a 
construction would have to be put upon these statutes 
in order to award compensation to the claimant in this 
case. There was no identifiable incident or accident. The 
judge was not at his place of employment. He was not 
performing judicial work. The mischief which would re-
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suit from a construction of the language of these statutes 
a warding compensation under these circumstances is ap-
parent. 
The decision of the district court awarding a pension 
should be reversed, and the order of the Utah State Re-
tirement Board denying a pension should be reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K. ROGER BEAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
190 S. Fort Lane, Suite 2 
Layton, Utah 84041 
20 
